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RICHARD W. EMORY, JR.*
On the topic of improving national enforcement as a key tool to better
governance under multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), I have the honor
to offer this short paper of recommendations. The views expressed here are
entirely my own and do not represent those of United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) or the U.S. Government. While I regret that I am
unable to attend the meeting, I hope that this paper will contribute to useful
discussion and outcomes.
Here I address "'enforcement" by national governments applying national law
against regulated enterprises (including "persons" of any type) to achieve
compliance with nationaf law to implement MEA obligations. More specifically, I
recommend steps by which (1) Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to MEAs and (2)
MEA Secretariats may support and strengthen "enforcement" by national
governments to this end. (I do not address related topics such as assuring
' For the past 14 years, Mr. Emory has served as a senior attorney in the international compliance
assurance unit of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. A 1967 graduate of Harvard Law School,
he has 29 years of government experience in both civil and criminal environmental enforcement. He
has worked at the state, national, and international levels, and in all three branches of government. The
views expressed herein are his own and do not represent the USEPA. This article is based only on
information previously published officially or reported publicly. Since 2006, only a very few revisions
have been made.
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"compliance" by national governments with their MEA obligations, the role of the
WTO, international law, or trade measures.)
In what follows, sections I-III describe structural and institutional measures to
enable MEAs to better support national enforcement. In addition, for the topic of
import/export control, section IV offers a number of solutions addressing mostly
systems, process, and operations.
I. ESTABLISH AN ENFORCEMENT COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIES
If the Parties to a MEA have the vision or goal that as national governments
they want more MEA enforcement, the Parties should form an Enforcement
Committee of the Parties. National representatives to Enforcement Committees of
the Parties should be persons who have had hands-on, on-duty enforcement
experience. This means that their expertise and identities should not or will not be
the same as that of:
" The high-level policy makers who are the National Focal Points for
MEAs,
" Persons who serve on chemical-selection, wildlife-listing, and other
such committees where scientific research, environmental
monitoring, and standard setting are done, or
" Persons, often with diplomatic or trade expertise, who serve on
Compliance Committees and address on a state-to-state basis
questions of national compliance and the application of MEA
compliance-assurance mechanisms to other nations.
While an Implementation Committee of the Parties may address enforcement,
"implementation" is a very broad word, and Implementation Committees have not
produced sufficient progress in enforcement. The most undiluted, immediate, and
effective enforcement results will be obtained by forming Enforcement
Committees of the Parties.
II. HIRE MORE STAFF WITH ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE
If the secretariat of a MEA has the vision or goal that, as an international civil
servant, he or she wants to support more MEA enforcement, hire staff with the
relevant experience. Such personnel would not enforce. They would credibly
interact with and support national authorities actually doing the enforcement.
MEA secretariats staffed with more enforcement experience should proactively
propose and (within their authority) take supportive actions, and raise issues of
enforcement policy for decisions by Enforcement Committees of the Parties and by
COPs.
III. DESIGNATE AND EMPOWER ONE UNIT OF UNEP TO BE THE COORDINATING
LEAD INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR SUPPORT TO NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
If the United Nations (UN) system and the COPs of the MEAs have the vision
or the goal that MEA enforcement should be more synergized, collectively
designate one unit of UNEP to be the coordinating lead agency for cross-cutting
enforcement issues affecting all or many MEAs. The unit that is "UNEP Lead for
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MEA Enforcement Support" will need some new (but limited) powers and duties,
including:
" Institutional responsibility for ongoing work to address and offer
synergistic solutions to improve national enforcement and
international cooperation supporting it for MEAs,"
" Authority to convene and to present for consideration new,
systematic approaches, and some new means to encourage
integration as may be needed among currently quite autonomous
individual MEA secretariats, and
" Representational authority to meet regularly with InterPol, the World
Customs Organization (WCO), the U.N. Centre for Trade
Facilitation and Electronic Business (CEFACT), and other public
(and non-governmental, as appropriate) international organizations,
to coordinate on behalf of all MEA secretariats on cross-cutting
issues.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO ILLEGAL INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The remaining solutions are focused on import/export control (I do not
address the many aspects of national enforcement that are domestic or internal).
To combat international trafficking that undercuts MEAs, there is enormous
potential for improved measures that are simple and effective. An ultimate goal
should be comprehensive data management with automated inter-ministerial data
linkages to assure real-time approvals and interdictions. Where today national
regulatory action is failing, it can become quick and accurate.
For constructive change to occur, directors of MEA secretariats and
concerned Parties should provide more vision and leadership. First, develop a
comprehensive vision of the prerequisites needed to enable effective national
enforcement - such as a more uniform and integrated international system and the
other steps or solutions offered in this paper - and a vision of what constitutes
effective national enforcement (some indicators or measures of enforcement
success). Second, establish more leadership to implement the steps to the vision-
leadership to cause steady, regular action on solutions offered in this paper.
Implementation of the following solutions usually would follow the same process,
1. Propose to all Parties,
2. Pilot among willing Parties, and
3. Prescribe by decisions of COPs that successful measures become
treaty obligations.
A. Designate and Empower One Unit among each Nation's MEA Focal Points to
be "National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination "
MEA secretariats individually and the "UNEP Lead for MEA Enforcement
Support" should encourage each Party to designate one unit among the MEA Focal
Points of a national government to be the lead agency for coordinating with the
national customs ministry on common (or '"cross-cutting") enforcement issues
affecting all or many of the MEAs to which the nation is a Party. The Party's unit
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that is "National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination" will be responsible at
the national level for moving toward integration and uniformity, to reduce the
fragmentation and confusion within and among national ministries that multiple
MEA Focal Points have created for customs officers.
Below the level of MEA Focal Points, in most countries the operational
national programs for approving and monitoring international trade are complex,
varied, and dispersed among and within ministries. It is essential that these
national programs organize themselves both to streamline operations and present
one window to front-line customs officers who need to know where to request
quick environmental assistance to implement MEAs at borders. National
ministries that are responsible for MEAs yet unable or unwilling to reform may
need a presidential order or legislation.
B. Link each Nation's Customs Ministry with the Nation's Environmental (and
other MEA Focal-Point) Ministries
MEA secretariats should suggest to or encourage Parties to focus on linking
customs ministries with environmental (and other MEA Focal-Point) ministries in
each Party nation. For example, to integrate and channel all trade-data
communications in the U.S., Customs and Border Protection and each U.S.
national ministry wanting its help for trade control must create what is called the
"single-window." This data linkage will be a good foundation to enable full-scope
cooperation in all aspects of the inter-ministerial working relationship.
For delivery to each "National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination" of
a Party, the UNEP unit that is the "UNEP Lead for MEA Enforcement Support"
should develop a Model National Inter-Ministerial MEA Cooperation Agreement.
This document would provide a framework and offer generic details of effective
intra-governmental, domestic working relationships. Within any Party, its
"National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination" would negotiate such an
agreement with the national customs ministry. Such agreements should make
arrangements for routine inter-ministerial information sharing, and should organize
these diverse ministries around the shared goals of permitting and tracking (i.e.,
monitoring compliance of) international shipments effectively (with speed and
accuracy).
Arrangements for inter-ministerial information sharing must be appropriate to
the state of development of any Party. A Model National Inter-Ministerial MEA
Cooperation Agreement should arrange for information to move by paper and fax.
As for Parties to an MEA (at least those that are advanced countries) that have the
vision or goal to use computers to achieve speed and accuracy in permitting and
tracking of international shipments, a Model National Inter-Ministerial MEA
Cooperation Agreement will establish the means for comprehensive data
management with automated inter-ministerial data linkages to assure real-time
approvals and interdictions.
C. Require Product-Specific Codes so that Modern Methods Including Computers
can be Used
If the Parties to an MEA have the vision or goal that modem methods
including computers should be usable to achieve speed and accuracy in permitting
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and tracking of international shipments, with the assistance of MEA secretariats,
Parties should move to develop and, by decisions of the COPs, to require as MEA
obligations that Parties use chemical-specific and other-product-specific codes. In
addition, codes should be explored and as soon as feasible required both for
business entities and "persons" of any type, and for physical plants or facilities
subject to regulation to implement MEAs.
As the WCO's HTS codes often are too broad or general to assure accurate
compliance monitoring, they can be supplemented by more detailed codes
sometimes called "qualifiers". For example, for chemicals the required coding
could well be the HTS code hyphenated to the CAS code. The WCO may
facilitate and accommodate such product-specific qualifiers, but it is not likely to
require them for environmental (non-customs) purposes. This is likely to be the
responsibility of MEAs. Achieving this overdue measure is a prerequisite to using
computers to manage MEA data needed for national approvals and interdictions.
D. Propose/Pilot/Prescribe More Standardized Licensing Schemes and Movement
Documents
Within MEA secretariats, design and propose to the Parties systematic
approaches to compliance monitoring for imports and exports. Presently, most
MEAs allow and (where lacking detailed models or standards) do little to
discourage a plethora of discordant national approaches. The burden on customs
officers to comprehend and recognize MEA requirements and covered trade is too
great. As examples:
" Even where licensing is required as a treaty obligation, the details of
any scheme may be whatever a nation imagines - or fails to imagine
properly.
" It is worse for shipping documents. For example, a customs officer,
instead of just one or perhaps 5 or 10 movement-documents formats,
may be faced with hundreds or a thousand or more (e.g., 5 MEAs X
200 countries = 1,000 different movement documents).
To customs officers, MEAs may be analogized to satellites in space. Both
seem unreal - impossibly remote, mysterious, and disconnected. Let us compare
to MEA secretariats the operators of television satellites in relation to their
customers, television owners wanting satellite programming. Like front-line
customs posts, individual television sets will fail to operate without having
essential and highly complex connections that their individual operators can
scarcely imagine or create for themselves. For this reason, satellite signal
providers carefully design and offer one system with the best means to make all
linkages (see para. IV(B) above on linkages), including dishes and cables all
properly coded (see para. IV(C) above on codes) to connect with end users.
Customs officers should enjoy an MEA system presenting a comprehensible
uniformity and connectedness from top to bottom, from MEA secretariat to
customs post. An MEA compliance-monitoring system would include an
international model or standardized (1) notification/application form, (2)
licensing/approval process, and (3) accompanying documentation form. In
addition to a paper process, there would be a parallel paperless process available
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for advanced countries. The result of good MEA systems design for any customs
officer also could be a seamless "plug-in-and-play" experience, almost as ordinary
and simple as switching on a television properly connected to a satellite!
The system of passports (for humans exporting and importing themselves)
also is ordinary, routine, and unremarkable. It is a useful vision for what may be
achieved for shipments controlled by MEAs. For human travelers, Parties have
agreed to prescribe national passports that are highly standardized. Customs
officers instantly recognize human passports, and - because of their commonality
and compatibility-they know exactly what they mean and how to read them. The
shipment (a human) is recognized by two unique identifiers (the individual's
picture and file number or code), and for immediate verification usually there is an
automated inter-ministerial data linkage (a bar code) by which the customs officer
can check instantly with the approving ministry. At national option, visas can be
required to document prior informed consent to import a traveler.
For chemicals and other products, MEA secretariats could well move to offer
more detailed legal elements and programs for national compliance monitoring for
imports and exports, both for notification/approval/licensing schemes and for
movement documents. At least for electronic messaging, CEFACT provides an
existing forum bringing together industry (see para. IV(G) below), customs, and
environmental professionals. This work is similar to and may encompass
standardization for MEA import/export messaging processes. The "UNEP Lead
for MEA Enforcement Support" (see para. III above) could well join in the
CEFACT work. As models or proposed standards are developed for MEAs, during
any piloting or testing phase, Parties may chose to take up (plug in to) a proposed
model or standard. As these are refined and proven successful in testing, COPs
should convert them to become required elements of national law within
increasingly standardized international systems. As Parties adopt international
standards, they would reduce the confusion of discordant national schemes.
As with human passports and CEFACT, for chemicals (and other products
regulated by MEAs) the purpose of adopting an international system for
compliance monitoring would not be to diminish but to bolster national
sovereignty to deal with violations. These occur mostly in international travel and
trade between nations, when only briefly may violators (whether human
passengers or chemicals) be within the grasp of a nation's jurisdiction. Good
systems design will enable any nation - during the moment when a violator is
present at the national port or border - to enforce effectively. More international
standardization will not mean supra-national "world government." It will mean
that MEA secretariats and leading Parties will have done more to enable all Parties
to fulfill their treaty obligations to effective national enforcement.
E. Develop an Intelligence Capability to Anticipate Illegality and Assess Threats
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol) failed to anticipate illegality, assess threats, and foresee that its
implementation would give rise to black markets and rampant smuggling by
organized and entrepreneurial criminals. This failure now should not be repeated.
VOL. 36:3/4
IMPROVING NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
For example, while probably there will be little trade for most chemicals
covered by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(Stockholm Convention), for this and the Rotterdam Convention, each chemical
and its market should be studied. Analysts first would look domestically or
internally for black markets. If a black market is found, the analysis would extend
to possible foreign sources and users. If there are any, this finding would implicate
international trade. Some seaports or transit nations that are suspected smuggling
entrepots should be studied and be the subjects of intelligence threat assessments.
This work could be undertaken by key Parties on behalf of all, or perhaps by the
unit of UNEP designated to be the coordinating lead agency for cross-cutting
enforcement issues.
The resulting MEA risk assessments and inspection targeting criteria will be
welcomed by customs ministries. With this information, they will be able to
expedite apparently legitimate trade and have a rational basis for focusing their
scarce inspectional resources only on shipments most deserving close scrutiny.
For customs ministries, success will be finding more environmental violators by
better applying front-line resources that are not increasing.
F. Require that Criminal Penalties be Available
If the Parties to a MEA want to maximize deterrence ("voluntary"
compliance) and (where there are serious violations) to interest prosecutors and
judges, they should enact explicit criminal penalties, including prison time. (It is
not enough to use "illegal," a word that at least includes minor infractions but does
not necessarily extend to what is "criminal.") The most serious punishments are
appropriate for many import/export violations, where usually there will be criminal
intent and culpability, for several reasons:
" Persons involved will have great sophistication (knowledge) to be in
the business of shipping in commercial quantities internationally,
" Groups of smugglers often are organized as criminal enterprises,
" The large risk of harm and therefore wrongfulness, such as
contributing to species extinction, or mishandling of chemicals
globally recognized as most environmentally hazardous, it is or
should be obvious to persons involved, and
" The illegality of the conduct is known and intended, as proven by
evasive or clandestine behavior.
COPs should require as an MEA obligation that national law provide
available criminal penalties for appropriate cases.
To maintain balance, MEA secretariats and Parties should not speak only of
concern for investigating illegal trafficking and crime fighting. Of equal concern
should be promoting and monitoring compliance for all shipments, and for
expediting clearance of the majority of shipments that are legitimate. Front-line,
uniformed customs inspectors first must be enabled to succeed (in the routine
compliance monitoring and detection of suspect shipments) before there will be
many cases for law-enforcement officers who are criminal investigators. For
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routine infractions that do not rise to criminality, Parties should be encouraged to
provide administrative processes and penalties.
G. Engage Legitimate Industry as Partners
Here and in other import-export measures, when designing national regulatory
programs, MEA secretariats and Parties should engage legitimate industry (e.g.,
trade associations of importers and exporters). The leading stakeholders will:
" Know much (have useful intelligence) about their unlawful
competitors who are undercutting the stakeholders' legitimate
businesses,
" Use modem methods, including computers [available] commercially,
to achieve speed and accuracy in tracking of their international
shipments,
" Understand and apply systems design to their production and
transportation processes,
" Engage in international standardization efforts and organizations,
and
" Cooperate with governments to combat illegal enterprises and to
assist governments to develop information technology systems to
achieve on-line (computerized) notifications, applications, and
tracking of international shipments.
For example, to support the implementation of the Montreal Protocol by the
U.S. government in the enforcement of the U.S. Clean Air Act, the private sector
provided key assistance including intelligence and sampling equipment. The result
was the detection and criminal conviction of many smugglers of ozone-depleting
substances. This fruitful collaboration can be repeated. With outreach to private
stakeholders, secretariats and national governments can join with legitimate
industry to achieve as shared goals expedited clearance of proper shipments and
real-time detection and investigation of suspect shipments.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper has described solutions by which MEA secretariats
and concerned Parties may support and strengthen "enforcement" by national
governments. Paragraphs I III described U.N. structural and institutional
measures to this end. For the key international topic import/export control, this
paper offered a vision of a more integrated system. To realize the improvements
described, MEA secretariats and concerned Parties should exercise more
leadership in a regular course of action to:
1. Propose models and possible standards to all Parties,
2. Pilot these measures among willing Parties, and
3. Prescribe by decisions of COPs that successful measures become
international standards and MEA (treaty) obligations.
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